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Purpose – Firms tend to transfer more knowledge in technology joint ventures compared to 
contractual technology agreements. Using insights from new institutional economics, the chapter 
explores to what extent the alliance governance association with interfirm knowledge transfer is 
sensitive to an evolving industry norm of collaboration connected to the logic of open innovation. 
 
Methodology/approach – The chapter examines 1,888 dyad-year observations on firms engaged 
in technology alliances in the U.S. information technology industry during 1980-1999. Using 
fixed effects linear models, it analyzes longitudinal changes in the alliance governance 
association with interfirm knowledge transfer, and how such changes vary in magnitude across 
bilateral versus multipartner alliances, and across computers, telecommunications equipment, 
software, and microelectronics subsectors. 
 
Findings – Increases in industry-level alliance activity during 1980-1999 improved the 
knowledge transfer performance of contractual technology agreements relative to more 
hierarchical equity joint ventures. This effect was concentrated in bilateral rather than 
multipartner alliances, and in the software and microelectronics rather than computers and 
telecommunications equipment subsectors. 
 
Practical implications – An evolving industry norm of collaboration may sometimes make more 
arms-length governance of a technology alliance a credible substitute for equity ownership, 
which can reduce the costs of interfirm R&D. 
 
Originality/value – The chapter shows that the performance of material practices that constitute 
innovation ecosystems, such as interfirm technology alliances, may differ over time subject to 
prevailing institutional norms of open innovation. This finding generates novel implications for 
the literatures on alliances, open innovation, and innovation ecosystems. 
 
 
Key words: open innovation; industry norm of collaboration; technology alliance governance; 
multipartner alliances; interfirm knowledge transfer; information technology 
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 Since the early 1980s, firms in knowledge-intensive industries such as biopharmaceuticals 
and information technology have widely increased their activities in the area of what Chesbrough 
(2003a) calls ‘open innovation’. As opposed to closed innovation, open innovation signifies an 
innovation logic in which firms progressively encourage and engage in research and development 
(R&D) activities with a variety of external parties (Laursen & Salter, 2006), for example through 
collaboration with universities and end users (Adams, Chiang, & Starkey, 2001; von Hippel, 
2005), corporate venture capital investments (Dushnitsky, 2006), open source projects (Kogut & 
Metiu, 2001), spinoff ventures (Parhankangas & Arenius, 2003), and technology alliances with 
competition (Hagedoorn, 2002). Therefore, the success of firms increasingly rests on their ability 
to manage interactions with a range of different competitors, complementors, and distributors 
within their innovation ecosystem (Adner, 2006; Kapoor, 2013a; West & Wood, 2013). 
With few exceptions, largely limited to descriptive historical accounts at the individual 
firm or industry levels of analysis (Chesbrough, 2003a; Powell, 1996; Powell & Giannella, 2010), 
research has typically focused on the different material practices that constitute open innovation 
(Dahlander & Gann, 2010). But beyond material practices, open innovation also reflects the 
progressive institutionalization of collaborative norms at the industry level (Pattit, Raj, & 
Wilemon, 2012). We know comparatively less about the ways in which such broader industry 
norms condition the optimal organization of the different material practices that constitute 
innovation ecosystems. Consequently, an important question is how the performance of open 
innovation practices changes when an industry norm of collaboration evolves. 
Firms embedded in innovation ecosystems need to manage their interactions with 
competitors, complementors, and distributors and so they face critical managerial challenges 
along a number of performance dimensions (Adner, 2006): How can knowledge transfer to and 
from competitors be encouraged? How can interdependence with various complementors be 
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managed? How can coordination across stages of the value chain be created and sustained? While 
answers to all three questions are important in order to understand the performance implications 
of firms’ innovation ecosystems, here, I focus on the first by studying interfirm knowledge 
transfer in one among a broader possible set of open innovation practices—technology alliances 
among competitors (Hagedoorn, 2002; Mowery & Teece, 1996). Therefore, the research question 
I set out to answer is this: how does knowledge transfer in interfirm technology alliances change 
when an industry norm of collaboration evolves?  
I address this question in three steps. I begin with the observation that in technology 
alliances that firms establish to perform joint research and development related to new 
technologies, products, and processes, interfirm knowledge transfer is likely to be greater when 
the alliance is governed by a more hierarchical equity joint venture rather than a more arms-
length contractual agreement (Oxley & Wada, 2009). Second, I propose that in the U.S. 
information technology (IT) industry, the empirical context of my study, an industry norm of 
collaboration evolved during 1980-1999, which progressively acted as an institutional reputation 
and monitoring system. Finally, drawing on Williamson’s (1991) ‘shift parameter’ framework, I 
develop and test the argument that this industry norm of collaboration represented an institutional 
shift parameter that disproportionally augmented knowledge transfer in more arms-length 
contractual agreements relative to more hierarchical equity joint ventures. 
Longitudinal analysis of 1,888 dyad-year observations on firms engaged in technology 
alliances in the U.S. IT industry during 1980-1999 broadly suggests support for the proposition 
that an industry norm of collaboration moderated the alliance governance association with 
interfirm knowledge transfer: over time, contractual agreements became significantly more 
effective as knowledge transfer conduits compared to joint ventures. Motivated both by 
conceptual differences between bilateral and multipartner alliances and by differences in the 
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proliferation of collaborative norms across several IT subsectors during the study period, the 
empirical analysis also speaks to two plausible contingencies that add nuance to the aggregated 
shift parameter effect. First, the benefits of an industry norm of collaboration appear concentrated 
disproportionally in bilateral rather than multipartner alliances and so particularly bilateral 
contractual agreements seem to have benefited from an industry norm of collaboration. Second, 
consistent with the idea that some IT subsectors may have seen a more significant increase in the 
prevalence and importance of collaborative norms during 1980-1999, the shift parameter effect 
appears concentrated in the software and microelectronics rather than computers and 
telecommunications equipment subsectors. These results generate conceptual implications for the 
literatures on alliances, open innovation, and innovation ecosystems. One managerial implication 
is that an evolving industry norm of collaboration may sometimes make more arms-length 
governance a credible substitute for equity ownership, thus reducing the costs of interfirm R&D. 
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
Technology alliance governance, appropriability hazards, and interfirm knowledge transfer 
Technology alliances constitute an important knowledge transfer mechanism because they 
channel the exchange of technological knowledge between partnered firms (Gomes-Casseres, 
Hagedoorn, & Jaffe, 2006; Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996; Oxley & Wada, 2009; 
Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003; Stuart & Podolny, 1999). In this study, I define interfirm 
knowledge transfer as the process through which the technological knowledge of one firm is 
learned and applied by another firm, as reflected in changes within the latter’s knowledge stock 
(Argote, McEvily, & Reagans, 2003; Darr & Kurtzberg, 2000). 
Several studies suggest that the governance structure of technology alliances may 
influence interfirm knowledge transfer (Mowery et al., 1996; Oxley & Wada, 2009). The 
governance structure of alliances is important because it sets the conditions within which the 
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partner firms can manage their relationship effectively (Oxley, 1997). Governance structures 
range from more arms-length contractual agreements between independent firms to more 
hierarchical equity-based joint ventures in which the partner firms “share ownership of the assets 
and derived revenues and, thus, share monitoring and control rights” (Kogut, 1988: 175). From a 
transaction cost economics perspective, the optimal governance structure is the one that most 
competently addresses the contracting hazards of a given transaction (Oxley, 1997; Pisano, 
1989). Absent notable contracting hazards, the default governance structure for an interfirm 
alliance is a contractual agreement, but when contracting hazards increase, an alliance may be 
more effectively governed by an equity joint venture (Oxley, 1997; Sampson, 2004). 
The primary contracting hazards in technology alliances are appropriability hazards, the 
hazards associated with the leakage of valuable intellectual property (Oxley, 1997; Teece, 1986). 
The use of a contractual agreement for the development and transfer of technological knowledge 
requires specification of the relevant property rights, and the monitoring and control mechanisms 
that support partners’ cooperation ex post. This may be problematic for at least two reasons. First, 
ex ante specification of a firm’s knowledge and know-how would effectively allow an alliance 
partner to acquire it without cost (Arrow, 1962: 615). Second, a technology alliance is formed to 
create new technologies, products, and processes—any of which by definition do not exist at the 
time of contracting and so a better understanding of the contracted assets will only develop 
during the collaboration. 
Therefore, the inherent uncertainty and ambiguity in technology alliances will complicate 
adequate specification of contracts. Transaction cost economists thus argue that compared to a 
contractual agreement, a joint venture promotes greater cooperation and knowledge transfer 
between partnered firms because shared ownership helps align their incentives (Oxley & Wada, 
2009). Moreover, because a joint venture is a separate legal and physical entity with a joint 
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management board and administrative controls, and because of enhanced disclosure requirements 
(Pisano, 1989), it allows the partner firms to monitor and control the appropriation of 
technological knowledge (Kogut, 1988). Therefore, knowledge transfer should be greater in joint 
ventures compared to contractual agreements (Mowery et al., 1996; Oxley & Wada, 2009). 
The importance of industry norms 
The baseline expectation that equity joint ventures are associated with greater interfirm 
knowledge transfer than contractual agreements is agnostic about the industry environment 
within which partnered firms are embedded. However, firms perform their technology alliance 
activities against the backdrop of an evolving institutional environment that provides “a set of 
fundamental…ground rules” (Davis & North, 1971: 6). Institutional theories argue that industry 
norms represent one key set of ground rules that prescribe expectations about firms’ patterns of 
behavior (Scott, 2001). As Scott notes, “normative elements involve the creation of expectations 
that introduce a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension into social life” (2003: 880). A 
prevailing norm expresses the ultimate value attitudes held by individual actors, which then form 
the basis for “positive or negative sanctions that reinforce obedience to the institutional norm” 
(Coleman, 1990: 334). Therefore, normative conformity may be an important source of 
reputation and legitimacy when firms are subject to the sanctioning mechanisms associated with 
industry norms (Fauchart & von Hippel, 2008). 
Beyond arguing that macro-level industry norms may motivate firms to portray certain 
desirable behaviors, theoretical work in new institutional economics has suggested that an 
industry norm may represent a ‘shift parameter’ that can interact with micro-level institutional 
arrangements, such as governance structures in technology alliances, in shaping the benefits firms 
will reap from their transactions (Williamson, 1991). By this logic, it is reasonable to imagine 
that the alliance governance association with interfirm knowledge transfer may differ subject to 
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prevailing industry norms. This observation is critical to the extent that such industry norms 
change over time, in which case the optimal organization of otherwise identical technology 
alliances may differ depending on the period in which they occur. Building on this insight, in 
what follows I will situate my focus on knowledge transfer in technology alliances within the 
empirical context of my study—the U.S. information technology industry during 1980-1999—to 
develop the argument that an evolving industry norm of collaboration has shifted knowledge 
transfer performance from more towards less hierarchical alliance governance structures. 
An industry norm of collaboration in IT, 1980-1999 
 An industry norm of collaboration is one industry norm that has emerged during the past 
several decades, especially within knowledge-intensive industries such as biopharmaceuticals and 
information technology (Pattit et al., 2012: 314-315). It represents an element of the broader logic 
that Chesbrough (2003a) has labeled ‘open innovation’, an emergent innovation model in which 
firms systematically encourage and engage in R&D activities with a range of external actors 
(Dahlander & Gann, 2010; Laursen & Salter, 2006). 
In the U.S., after several decades following World War II characterized by the inward 
orientation of industrial R&D (Mowery & Teece, 1996), the emergence of an industry norm of 
collaboration, and more open innovation practices in general, was reflected in a number of 
developments. For example, the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 began to permit universities and small 
businesses to claim ownership of intellectual property associated with federally funded research 
(Mowery, Nelson, Sampat, & Ziedonis, 2004). It was one of the factors increasing the number 
and size of industry-university cooperative research centers that stimulated technology transfer 
between academic institutions and industry (Adams et al., 2001). Not surprisingly, perhaps, the 
percentage of university research funded by industry rose from about 4% in the 1980s to about 
20% during the early 1990s (Cohen, Florida, & Goe, 1994; Rosenberg & Nelson, 1996). 
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U.S. universities also began creating spinouts at an increasing rate, which progressively 
created linkages between academia and industry (Mowery et al., 2004). As a consequence, the 
percentage of new products and processes based on academic research increased during the 1980s 
and 1990s. Mansfield (1998) presents survey data suggesting that in the information processing 
industry, the percentage of new products and processes that could not have been developed in the 
absence of recent academic research rose from 11% (for both products and processes) during 
1975-1985 to, respectively, 19% for products and 16% for processes during 1986-1994. 
Moreover, in the same industry, the average time interval between an academic finding and the 
commercial introduction of a product or process developed with very substantial aid from such a 
finding decreased from 6.2 years during 1975-1985 to 2.4 years during 1986-1994. 
Beyond a growth in the number and extent of university-industry linkages, a second factor 
reflecting an emerging industry norm of collaboration is a growth in the level of corporate 
venture capital (CVC) investments during 1980-1999, especially in sectors such as computers, 
telecommunications, and semiconductors (Dushnitsky, 2006). The trend in CVC investments 
paralleled a steep increase in the availability of venture capital more broadly (Gompers & Lerner, 
2001). CVC investments are interfirm relationships that allow established firms to tap into 
emerging technology fields and major IT companies such as Intel, Cisco, and Microsoft were 
among the largest venturing firms driving this growth. Underlying the explosive growth in CVC 
investment during the 1980s and 1990s is the fact that among the largest venturing firms during 
1969-1999, all IT-related firms except Xerox and Motorola began investing only well after 1980 
(Dushnitsky, 2006: 395). 
A third development indicative of a mounting trend towards collaboration is firms’ 
increasing engagement with customers (von Hippel, 2005). For example, John Armstrong, former 
vice president for science and technology at IBM, describes the proliferation of joint projects 
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between IBM researchers and customers (Armstrong, 1996). Involvement of customers, in 
general, and lead users, in particular, has increased in scale and importance in IT sectors such as 
microelectronics (custom integrated circuits, see von Hippel, 2005: 127-128) and software, where 
user communities have increasingly contributed to the development of open-source software 
(Kogut & Metiu, 2001; Lerner & Tirole, 2002). 
A fourth reflection of firms’ increasing commitment to open innovation, following a 
broader wave of corporate refocusing during the 1980s (Davis, Diekmann, & Tinsley, 1994), has 
been their growing propensity to generate spinoff ventures (Chesbrough, 2003b; Parhankangas & 
Arenius, 2003). Such spinoffs began to generate networks of knowledge transfer and resource 
sharing between established and new firms. Spinoffs are consistent with firms’ refocusing on 
their core activities and reducing the scale and scope of internal R&D. During the 1980s the IT 
industry went through a gradual process of vertical de-integration and towards horizontal 
organization, which increased the specialization of firms’ technological knowledge (Bresnahan & 
Greenstein, 1999; Langlois, 1990; Macher & Mowery, 2004). Growing specialization was 
reflected in the increasing distribution of technological knowledge and intellectual property rights 
across firms. For example, the number of firms performing R&D in the U.S. information 
technology industry more than doubled between 1986 and 1999, while employment in firms with 
over 10,000 employees dropped by roughly 30% during 1980-1999 (National Science 
Foundation, 2010). Moreover, the number of corporate assignees successfully filing IT patents 
increased from less than 1,000 in 1980 to more than 4,000 in 1999 (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 
2002). Therefore, firms became gradually more dependent on others to implement their 
technological knowledge in integrated solutions. 
To this point, examples reflecting an evolving industry norm of collaboration have 
focused on university-industry collaboration, investment into and creation of new firms, and 
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interaction with users. In all those categories, the IT industry has seen a steady increase in 
activity during 1980-1999 and so it appears reasonable to imagine that open innovation norms 
may have become increasingly institutionalized within IT. 
A final factor consistent with an evolving industry norm of collaboration, and one 
particularly central to the thesis of this study, is a steep increase in the number of newly-formed 
technology alliances (Hagedoorn, 2002). Based on the Cooperative Agreements and Technology 
Indicators database (CATI, see Hagedoorn, 2002), Figure 1 describes patterns of technology 
alliance formation in the population of IT technology alliances during 1980-1999. 
--- Take in Figure 1 --- 
The aggregate number of newly-formed technology alliances increased considerably 
during this time window, from a few dozen in the early 1980s to several hundreds in the 1990s. 
This trend reflects, first, the increasingly widespread distribution of technological assets (Hall et 
al., 2002) as well as changes in the antitrust regime in the U.S. through the National Cooperative 
Research Act of 1984, which reduced potential antitrust liabilities on research joint ventures and 
standards development organizations. Second, it is consistent with an increase in the costs of 
R&D (Hagedoorn, 1993; Mowery & Teece, 1996). Finally, an increase in international 
competition motivated especially U.S. firms to join their efforts to be able to face a growth in the 
number of technologically sophisticated competitors internationally (Nelson, 1990). Overall, the 
result was a steady increase in the connectedness of firms in IT through technology alliances 
(Cloodt, Hagedoorn, & Roijakkers, 2006, 2010), and the progressive centrality of prominent 
firms such as IBM, Hewlett-Packard, and Microsoft that began to function as “important 
mediators in the information flows among different partners” (Cloodt et al., 2006: 738). 
 Figure 1 also shows that the aggregate alliance formation pattern was characterized by a 
growth in the prevalence of contractual agreements relative to joint ventures. Moreover, IT 
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technology alliances became increasingly multisectoral—i.e., focused on multiple IT subsectors, 
such as computers, telecommunications equipment, microelectronics, and software. For example, 
large manufacturers like IBM began to adapt their technology alliance portfolios towards 
subsectors such as software to be able to become integrated service providers (Dittrich, Duysters, 
& de Man, 2007; Hagedoorn & Frankort, 2008). The increase in multisectoral technology 
alliances reflects the progressive convergence of individual subsectors, sparked in part by 
evolving interconnections across technologies such as computers, telecom, software, networking, 
and the Internet (Cloodt et al., 2006; Graham & Mowery, 2003; Mowery & Teece, 1996). 
--- Take in Figure 2 --- 
The proliferation of technology alliances within IT was also characterized by an increase 
in the formation of multipartner alliances. Figure 2 shows the number of newly-formed 
multipartner alliances in IT during 1980-1999. Multipartner alliances became increasingly 
popular during the 1980s, even though their growth stagnated somewhat during the 1990s. In 
subsectors such as microelectronics, the early growth of multipartner alliances was in part 
associated with the formation of the Semiconductor Industry Association (established in 1977) 
and consortia like SEMATECH (established in 1987), both of which stimulated and legitimized 
multiparty R&D collaboration (Browning, Beyer, & Shetler, 1995). 
 Overall, descriptive evidence shows that during 1980-1999, the IT industry witnessed 
increases in university-industry collaboration, investment into and creation of new firms, 
interaction with users, and technology alliances among competitors. Paired with the possibility 
that several open innovation practices may feed on each other—e.g., in the software subsector, 
Dushnitsky and Lavie (2010) show that alliances may function as an antecedent to their CVC 
investments and Van de Vrande and Vanhaverbeke (2013) show how the reverse may be true in 
pharmaceuticals—it is reasonable to suggest that an industry norm of collaboration became 
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progressively institutionalized in IT during 1980-1999. Using Williamson’s (1991) shift 
parameter framework, the following section begins to connect an industry norm of collaboration 
to the alliance governance association with interfirm knowledge transfer. 
An industry norm of collaboration as a shift parameter 
Central to Williamson’s (1991) shift parameter framework is the assumption that 
parameters of the institutional environment, such as an industry norm of collaboration, can 
interact with the institutions of governance, such as governance structures in technology 
alliances. An industry norm of collaboration is associated with value attitudes of cooperation as 
the basis for positive and negative sanctioning. I propose that variance in reputational concerns 
supplies the mechanism connecting an industry norm of collaboration and concomitant value 
attitudes of cooperation to the knowledge transfer implications of alliance governance. These 
reputational concerns arise both from the growing importance of a reputation for cooperation and 
an increasing likelihood that information about firms’ reputations spreads in the industry. 
First, linkages across firms in IT increased in prevalence and importance during 1980-
1999, which reflected both the progressive dependency of firms’ businesses on external 
partnering as well as the growing need to attract new partners in the future. Therefore, relational 
legitimacy—i.e., the “perceived worthiness as an attractive alliance partner” (Dacin, Oliver, & 
Roy, 2007: 174)—became more important to partnered firms. Because opportunistic behavior 
puts firms at risk of compromising their ability to form new alliances in the future, an increasing 
dependency on collaboration with external parties makes firms more likely to conform actively to 
behavioral norms associated with appropriate cooperative behavior (Suchman, 1995). 
Second, an increase in linkages across firms, in general, and technology alliances among 
competition, in particular, also generates the possibility that information about a firm’s reputation 
spreads more quickly within the industry. In a relatively disconnected setting, alliance partners 
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operate more or less in isolation, while growing interconnectedness exposes firms to a setting 
where the amount of information available about potential partners is progressively larger. 
Because firms draw on their external network to gather information about potential exchange 
partners (Gulati, 1999), both cooperative as well as opportunistic behaviors are more quickly and 
accurately communicated when firms are connected to each other through a larger number of 
direct and indirect linkages (Williamson, 1991: 290-291). Consistent with the idea that greater 
connectedness in turn reduces the probability of opportunism, Robinson and Stuart (2007) show 
that equity participation in a strategic alliance between two firms diminishes, and pledged 
funding increases, when the firms are more proximate in an industry’s alliance network. 
Overall, an industry norm of collaboration acts as an institutional reputation and 
monitoring system that establishes the importance of relational legitimacy and shapes firms’ 
ability to find out about others’ reputations. Therefore, when a reputation for cooperation 
becomes more important, the probability of opportunistic behavior is likely to decrease, which is 
reinforced by the likelihood that reputational information reaches a greater number of actors more 
quickly (Provan, 1993). 
A crucial question remains: does the reputation mechanism associated with an industry 
norm of collaboration operate differently in contractual agreements compared to joint ventures? 
Reputational concerns attenuate the probability of opportunistic behavior by alliance partners and 
should therefore have greater significance in situations where appropriation concerns are more 
prevalent (Oxley, 1999; Williamson, 1991). All else equal, the transactional hazards associated 
with the possibility that partners appropriate each other’s technological knowledge are greatest in 
alliances with a limited capacity to monitor and align the incentives of alliance partners—i.e., 
contractual agreements. In joint ventures, alternatively, the joint management board, 
administrative controls, and enhanced disclosure requirements allow partner firms to monitor and 
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control the appropriation of knowledge, while shared ownership helps align partners’ incentives. 
Therefore, broader reputational concerns should play a more limited role in joint ventures, where 
appropriation concerns are less pronounced. Overall, these arguments suggest that an industry 
norm of collaboration represents an institutional shift parameter whose benefits are concentrated 
disproportionally in contractual agreements rather than equity joint ventures. 
Hypothesis 1. An evolving industry norm of collaboration increases knowledge transfer 
in technology alliances governed by contractual agreement relative to those governed by 
equity joint venture. 
 
An industry norm of collaboration should act on the probability of opportunistic behavior 
depending on the monitoring and incentive alignment capacity of an alliance. Thus, if the number 
of partners in an alliance affects levels of monitoring and incentive alignment, then the shift 
parameter effect of an industry norm of collaboration (as summarized in Hypothesis 1) will not 
be neutral between bilateral and multipartner alliances. 
Multipartner alliances embed a collaborative dyad in a cohesive group of interacting firms 
because they connect partners through multiple reciprocal linkages (Li, Eden, Hitt, Ireland, & 
Garrett, 2012). By acting as an echo chamber for both positive and negative behaviors of 
partnered firms, cohesion in a multipartner alliance may act as a monitoring, reputation-inducing, 
structure that can align the incentives of partner firms. Two firms affiliated to one or more third 
parties are subject to stronger reputational concerns and the possibility that they will be 
sanctioned for noncooperative behavior (Burt & Knez, 1995). Multipartner alliances may thus 
contain a self-enforcing governance mechanism that lowers the value of noncooperative behavior 
within a dyad. Instead, others have suggested that multipartner alliances may be prone to strategic 
behaviors such as free riding and coalition building and so the probability of opportunism within 
a dyad may actually be greater, rather than smaller, when it is embedded in a multipartner 
alliance (Lavie, Lechner, & Singh, 2007). 
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Overall, cohesion and opportunism perspectives on multipartner alliances hold opposing 
views on the incentive properties of multipartner alliances compared to bilateral alliances, with 
the former arguing for stronger, and the latter for weaker, incentive alignment and monitoring in 
multipartner compared to bilateral alliances. All else equal, therefore, application of the shift 
parameter logic to the cohesion perspective suggests that an industry norm of collaboration 
increases knowledge transfer in bilateral relative to multipartner technology alliances, while the 
opportunism perspective on multipartner alliances instead suggests that an industry norm of 
collaboration increases knowledge transfer in multipartner relative to bilateral technology 
alliances. Integration of these views with the arguments motivating Hypothesis 1 thus generates 
two rival predictions. Given that monitoring and incentive alignment is weaker in contractual 
agreements compared to joint ventures, the cohesion perspective suggests that an industry norm 
of collaboration will have the greatest positive effect on knowledge transfer in bilateral 
contractual agreements, while the effect will be weakest in multipartner joint ventures. 
Hypothesis 2a. An evolving industry norm of collaboration increases knowledge transfer 
in bilateral technology alliances governed by contractual agreement relative to other 
technology alliances. 
 
Instead, the opportunism perspective on multipartner alliances suggests that an industry norm of 
collaboration will have the greatest positive effect on knowledge transfer in multipartner 
contractual agreements, while the effect will be weakest in bilateral joint ventures. 
Hypothesis 2b. An evolving industry norm of collaboration increases knowledge transfer 
in multipartner technology alliances governed by contractual agreement relative to other 
technology alliances. 
 
Differences across IT subsectors 
Computers, telecommunications equipment, microelectronics, and software are among the 
prominent IT subsectors to which firms directed their technology alliance activities during 1980-
1999. Differentiation in the sectoral emphasis of individual alliances naturally raises the question 
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to what extent alliances focusing on different subsectors were subjected more strongly to an 
evolving industry norm of collaboration. 
In response to the growth of the PC and networking markets, vertically integrated 
computer and telecommunication equipment manufacturers became more open, but often 
involving alternative subsectors (Cloodt et al., 2010). For example, when IBM entered the PC 
market, it did so through a software alliance with Microsoft and a microprocessor alliance with 
Intel (Malerba, Nelson, Orsenigo, & Winter, 1999). The latter in fact stimulated openness in 
microelectronics, and not computers, by forcing Intel to share intellectual property related to its 
microprocessors with second-source suppliers, such as AMD and Fujitsu (Hagedoorn & 
Schakenraad, 1992; Henkel, Baldwin, & Shih, 2012). Entry by new firms affected both 
computers and microelectronics subsectors during the 1980s, but established firms in 
microelectronics were much more active in encouraging such subsector entry through licensing 
and alliances (Macher & Mowery, 2004). In semiconductors, for example, integrated incumbents 
began to transact extensively with a large number of specialized, ‘fabless’, entrants (Kapoor, 
2013b). Moreover, in response to intensifying competition from the Japanese semiconductor 
industry, the Semiconductor Industry Association and consortia such as SEMATECH stimulated 
progressive collaboration among U.S. semiconductor firms (Browning et al., 1995), and such 
collaboration became more important with the advent of deep ultraviolet manufacturing 
technologies in the late 1980s (Iansiti, 1998). 
Vertical de-integration in computers was associated with large-scale entry by specialized 
software producers and, additionally, software radically increased in importance as a general 
purpose technology (Graham & Mowery, 2003). Because of the gradual commoditization of 
hardware, and given the growth of mass-markets for ‘packaged’ software, networked computing, 
and the Internet, dynamism in the industry amplified as its focus shifted from computer hardware 
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in the early 1980s towards a multitude of software applications in the 1990s. Moreover, as a 
result of an increasing demand for integrated systems, software has also steeply increased in 
importance to semiconductor firms since the beginning of the 1990s (Grimblatt, 2002).1 
Underlining the increasing liability of disconnectedness in such a setting, Cloodt et al. note that 
“to increase their ability to respond very quickly to the changes surrounding them...companies 
had to remain open innovators” (2010: 125). 
This discussion suggests that microelectronics and software subsectors may have seen a 
more significant increase in the prevalence and importance of open innovation norms during 
1980-1999 than computers and telecommunications equipment subsectors. Therefore, the effects 
as predicted in Hypotheses 1 and 2a/b are likely to be stronger in these two subsectors, though I 
leave this as an open empirical question. I next examine the shift parameter logic in the context of 
the U.S. information technology industry, both across and within individual industry subsectors. 
METHOD 
Data 
I use data on technology alliance governance and patenting by firms engaged in 
technology alliances in the U.S. information technology industry during 1980-1999. Part of the 
data I use was matched for analyses reported in Gomes-Casseres et al. (2006). The alliance data 
come from CATI (Hagedoorn, 2002), the patent data come from the NBER patent data file (Hall 
et al., 2002), and several control variables come from COMPUSTAT. For this study, I added data 
from CATI, containing information about technology alliances formed since 1960; from USPTO, 
Osiris, Datastream, the SEC and 10K filings, the U.S. Census Bureau, Eurostat, firms’ annual 
reports, and numerous press releases. 
                                                          
1
 Consistent with the comparative importance of software collaborations, Kapoor (2013a) finds that the collaboration 
of semiconductor firms with software complementors is more strongly associated with information sharing in R&D 
and joint product development than collaboration with other complementors. 
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Three rules combined to determine firms’ inclusion in the estimation sample. First, firms 
needed at least one patent in the IT patent classes in 1980-1999. Second, firms needed at least one 
technology alliance in IT during 1980-1999. Third, in each dyad, at least one firm needed to be 
headquartered in the United States. I generated a dyad-year panel to test the refutable implications 
of the shift parameter logic. In a total of 3,545 dyad-year records, due to a lag specification and 
missing data on some of the control variables, I have complete data for 1,888 dyad-years, which 
form the basis for the statistical analyses. The panel is unbalanced, reflecting firms’ increasing 
proclivity to enter into technology alliances during 1980-1999 (Hagedoorn, 2002). 
All dyad and firm-level measures are based on yearly adjacency matrices reflecting firms’ 
technology alliance activities within a three-year window. For example, the 1993 matrix contains 
the alliances for 1991-1993, the 1994 matrix those for 1992-1994, and so on. Specifying an 
alliance window is important as for many alliances (roughly 90%) termination dates cannot be 
traced. Further, including alliances only in the formation year would severely underestimate their 
impact on knowledge transfer between partnered firms. I based the three-year window on the 
approximately 10% of alliances with traceable duration, as documented in CATI. Left censoring 
may be a concern for sample firms that were already in business prior to the sampling window. I 
therefore include the technology alliances formed by the sample firms between 1978 and 1980 in 
the 1980 adjacency matrix, and those formed in 1979 in the 1981 adjacency matrix. 
Dependent variable and analytic strategy 
The unit of analysis is the dyad-year and so the empirical models focus on how interfirm 
knowledge transfer varies over time with the governance of the alliance(s) within a dyadic 
relationship. Prior research suggests that an aggregated (here: dyad-level) count of the number of 
patent cross-citations may be a valid indicator of knowledge transfer, in general (Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg, & Fogarty, 2000), and within the context of interfirm technology alliances, in 
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particular (Frankort, Hagedoorn, & Letterie, 2012: 517-518). While citation-based approaches to 
interfirm knowledge transfer acknowledge that noise in patent citation measures is unavoidable, 
they assume that such noise would mainly add measurement error, inflating standard errors, 
forcing the estimates towards insignificance, and hence producing conservative estimates. 
However, some evidence suggests that beyond imprecision, patent citation measures may 
introduce bias as a consequence of citations inserted by patent examiners (Alcácer & Gittelman, 
2006), and such bias may actually lead to overstated results. Therefore, I follow Alcácer and 
Oxley (2013) in using as the dependent variable the overlap in the distribution of firms’ patenting 
activities across technology domains in a given year (Jaffe, 1986). While this measure is based on 
patents rather than patent citations, consistent with my knowledge transfer definition, it 
nevertheless captures the notion that convergence in firms’ technological activities can be viewed 
as evidence of interfirm knowledge transfer (Mowery et al., 1996). 
I begin with firm-level patent class distribution vectors Fi,t+1 = (F i,1,t+1…F i,K,t+1) describing 
firm i’s position in technology space in year t+1, where F i,k,t+1 is firm i’s number of patents 
successfully applied for in patent class k in year t+1. This generates two yearly vectors for each 
dyad, describing the distribution of partners’ patenting activity across the USPTO’s primary 
patent classes in existence during the sampling period (Hall et al., 2002: 452-453). The 

















which is the uncentered correlation of the firms’ patenting vectors. This measure is bounded by 0 
and 1, and values closer to 1 indicate a greater overlap between the patenting activities of firms i 
and j across technology domains in a given year. 
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The econometric models focus on the association between the technological overlap 
measure of interfirm knowledge transfer KTij,t+1 describing a dyadic relationship between two 
firms i and j in year t+1, and measures of alliance governance, multipartner collaboration, and an 
industry norm of collaboration in year t—vectors Xij,t and Xt. Specifically: 
ijtijijtijijttjjtiitijijttijijttijijtij WyKTE   ,,,,,,,1, )( YCCRXXXX , 
where Rij,t is a vector of dyad-level control variables; Ci,t, Cj,t, and Yt are vectors of firm and 
time-period effects, respectively; λij,t is an inverse Mills ratio; Wyij,t is a dyad autocorrelation 
term; and δij is a dyad-specific fixed effect. All independent and control variables are lagged by 
one year to avoid simultaneity. I estimate all models using fixed effects linear specifications. 
Alliance governance may be based on firm, dyad, or industry characteristics and so 
similar factors may determine both alliance governance and interfirm knowledge transfer 
(Shaver, 1998). From an omitted variables perspective (Heckman, 1979), alliance governance is 
therefore endogenous in the knowledge transfer equation if key determinants of alliance 
governance that correlate with interfirm knowledge transfer remain uncontrolled. To capture 
several such factors, I use a number of control variables and I capture unobserved heterogeneity 
by including dyadic and time fixed effects, and a dyad autocorrelation variable. Additionally, I 
use two-stage specifications that account for a selection hazard (Heckman, 1979). To absorb any 
effects on interfirm knowledge transfer that would otherwise be spurious treatment effects of 
alliance governance, I include an inverse Mills ratio (i.e., λij,t) constructed from robust probit 
estimates in the knowledge transfer models. Appendix A details estimation of the probit model. 
Independent variables 
Technology alliance governance and multipartner collaboration 
I use the alliance classification data available in CATI to distinguish non-equity 
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contractual agreements (CATI categories: Joint Research Pacts and Joint Development 
Agreements) and equity joint ventures (CATI categories: Joint Ventures and Research 
Corporations). The variable Joint venture represents the share of joint ventures in all technology 
alliances within a dyad in a given year. Multipartner collaboration takes the value of ‘1’ in case 
at least one active technology alliance between two firms has three or more partners. 
Industry norm of collaboration 
I proxy an industry norm of collaboration using Industry alliances, the average number of 
newly formed IT alliances within the five-year window prior to the observation year. This 
measure reflects that the norm of collaboration evolved gradually, as captured by a moving 
average of year-by-year changes in the IT alliance formation series (see Figure 1). While 
admittedly a moving average of industry alliances is an imperfect proxy for an evolving industry 
norm of collaboration, estimation of models across subsectors that may have differed in the 
prevalence and importance of open innovation norms should assuage such a concern. 
I test Hypothesis 1 using the interaction between Joint venture and Industry alliances in 
the full sample. In subsamples distinguishing contractual agreements (Joint venture = 0) and joint 
ventures (Joint venture > 0), I assess the extent to which Industry alliances, the shift parameter, 
has a greater effect on knowledge transfer in contractual agreements compared to joint ventures. I 
test Hypotheses 2a/b using the interaction between Joint venture and Industry alliances in 
subsamples distinguishing bilateral alliances (Multipartner collaboration = 0) and multipartner 
alliances (Multipartner collaboration = 1). 
Moreover, I examine Hypothesis 1 across IT subsectors by comparing coefficients on the 
interaction between Joint venture and Industry alliances in subsector samples for computers and 
telecommunications equipment, microelectronics, and software. Finally, I examine Hypothesis 2 
across IT subsectors by comparing coefficients on the interaction between Joint venture and 
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Industry alliances in subsector samples for computers and telecommunications equipment, 
microelectronics, and software, after splitting the subsector samples by bilateral alliances 
(Multipartner collaboration = 0) and multipartner alliances (Multipartner collaboration = 1). 
To capture other macro factors homogeneously shaping the behavior and performance of 
sampled firms, I include dummies for each two-year period as time fixed effects. Inclusion of 
yearly dummies would preclude identification of the measure for industry alliances. In subsector 
analyses split by bilateral/multipartner alliances, I instead include a dummy for the 1990s to 
evade collinearity issues associated with two-year dummies, which would otherwise impact the 
stability of the estimates in several smaller subsamples. 
Control variables 
Dyad-level control variables 
 Partner-specific alliances controls for the number of active technology alliances between 
two firms, while Partner-specific alliance experience captures the number of technology 
alliances between the two partner firms prior to the current three-year window. Moreover, each 
pair of firms collaborated in one or several IT subsectors. Therefore, I include dummy variables 
for Computers/telecom (as a result of the internet, technologies in computers and 
telecommunications equipment subsectors virtually merged during the 1990s; see Mowery & 
Teece, 1996), Microelectronics, and Software, each taking the value of ‘1’ in case the alliance(s) 
between two firms concerned activities within these respective IT subsectors. The dummies are 
not mutually exclusive and so the counterfactual to a dyad’s activity within a particular subsector 
is activity in zero or more other subsectors. 
Firm-level control variables 
Firm attributes may influence interfirm knowledge transfer in two distinct ways (Lincoln, 
1984: 49-52). First, they index firms’ dispositional tendencies potentially affecting any dyad 
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firms are part of, irrespective of who is the alliance partner. Second, partner firms’ attributes may 
combine to determine knowledge transfer, engendering interaction effects that are dyad specific. 
To capture dispositional effects, I include the sum of two firms’ scores on the respective 
controls.2 Collinearity concerns preclude inclusion of the product terms for the firm-level controls 
in the knowledge transfer models. Because I have no substantive interest in these product terms 
as such, sole inclusion of the sum terms appears the most reasonable option.3 
To account for the general alliance experience of the partner firms, I include Alliance 
experience capturing partners’ total historical count of technology alliances formed outside the 
focal dyad until the observation year. I also include Time in network, measuring the number of 
years across which partners’ alliance experience had accumulated. I capture firm Age as partners’ 
logged age in years since incorporation. Also, because firms differ in size and R&D intensity, I 
control for firm Size by measuring partners’ asset value, and R&D intensity as the ratio of R&D 
spending to sales, in a given year. The asset-based firm size control is particularly important 
because firms that differ in asset intensity may have responded differently to the strengthening of 
patent rights especially in microelectronics and software, following the Diamond v. Diehr case in 
1981 and Texas Instruments’ successfully challenging several Japanese and U.S. semiconductor 
firms in court during 1985-1986 (Hall, 2005; Hall & Ziedonis, 2001). 
 Firms may be active in multiple dyads simultaneously and, when unaccounted for, this 
generates dyadic autocorrelation, potentially leading to systematically underestimated standard 
errors for firm attributes that are constant across multiple dyads within years (Lincoln, 1984). 
More importantly, such autocorrelation may lead to the misattribution of partners’ general 
                                                          
2
 Rather than including firm-level variables for the partner firms separately, for parsimony I include their sums as 
covariates (i.e., [Ci,t + Cj,t]). While doing so constrains the coefficients on the firm-level variables to equality, results 
of models in which they are entered separately are largely identical. 
3
 Jim Lincoln, personal communication. 
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proclivity to generate knowledge transfer within their alliances to characteristics of the focal dyad 
(such as alliance governance). Therefore, I control for Dyad autocorrelation (i.e., Wyij,t) as the 
mean of the dependent variable (technological overlap) for all dyads the partner firms maintained 
in a given year, but excluding the focal dyad (Lincoln, 1984: 56-61). Because any unobserved, 
time varying, firm characteristics driving interfirm knowledge transfer within the focal dyad 
would be manifest in the knowledge transfer within partners’ broader set of alliances, this 
autocorrelation control additionally helps rule out a number of time-varying sources of 
unobserved heterogeneity at the partner firm level. 
RESULTS 
Main results 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for all variables included in the analysis. Table 2 
shows estimates for the knowledge transfer models. 
--- Take in Tables 1 and 2 --- 
Models 1 and 2 in Table 2 present specifications based on the full sample. Model 1 shows 
the main effect for joint venture. Consistent with prior research, the model suggests that joint 
venture governance is associated with greater interfirm knowledge transfer than governance by 
contractual agreement, even after controlling for the endogeneity of alliance governance. All else 
equal, knowledge transfer—i.e., the subsequent overlap in the distribution of firms’ patenting 
activities across technology domains—is 0.126 units greater in a joint venture compared to a 
contractual agreement. The coefficient on the multipartner collaboration variable is insignificant. 
Model 2 turns to an assessment of the shift parameter logic. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the 
negative and significant interaction between Joint venture and Industry alliances suggests that the 
comparative knowledge transfer performance of joint ventures versus contractual agreements 
decreases in magnitude at higher levels of industry alliance activity. 
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Because these estimates are within-dyad, and because in the cross-section an individual 
alliance cannot at once be a contractual agreement and a joint venture, the interaction term in 
Model 2 artificially collapses separate longitudinal changes in the different governance 
structures. For example, the interaction is consistent with an industry norm of collaboration solely 
increasing knowledge transfer in contractual agreements. It is also consistent with an industry 
norm of collaboration increasing knowledge transfer in both governance structures, but more so 
in contractual agreements. To assess these alternatives, Models 3 and 4 present estimates split by 
individual governance structure. A split-sample approach generates more conservative estimates 
because it allows residual variance to differ across subsamples (Greene, 2003). In Models 3 and 
4, the coefficient for industry alliances is positive and significant for contractual agreements but 
insignificant for joint ventures. Therefore, it appears reasonable to suggest that an industry norm 
of collaboration has generated shifts in the knowledge transfer performance of alliances through a 
disproportionate complementary effect on alliances governed by contractual agreement. 
--- Take in Figure 3 --- 
The results in Models 3 and 4 are based on fixed effects specifications that impose a 
within-dyad correlation structure on the data. Therefore, we can interpret the effect of an industry 
norm of collaboration in Model 3 as acting on knowledge transfer in a contractual agreement 
moving through 1980-1999. Based on Model 3, Figure 3 shows estimates of knowledge transfer 
in a contractual agreement during the sampling period, assuming all else equal. The figure shows 
that knowledge transfer in contractual agreements has increased considerably over time. The 
conditional effect of industry alliances is 0.065 in 1980, while it is 0.711 in 1999 (see Figure 3). 
Because the sample standard deviation of technological overlap is 0.192, these estimates suggest 
that an industry norm of collaboration generated an increase in the knowledge transfer 
performance of contractual agreements of around 3.4 standard deviations during 1980-1999. 
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Models 5 and 6 in Table 2 show estimates split by bilateral versus multipartner alliances. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 2a, the interaction between Joint venture and Industry alliances is 
negative and significant in bilateral alliances (Model 5), while it is insignificant in multipartner 
alliances (Model 6). Therefore, the benefits of an industry norm of collaboration appear 
concentrated disproportionally in bilateral contractual agreements. Because the reputation 
mechanism associated with an industry norm of collaboration should act on the probability of 
opportunistic behavior depending on the monitoring and incentive alignment capacity of an 
alliance, this result suggests that the baseline probability of opportunism in multipartner alliances 
is lower than that in bilateral alliances. 
It is important to note that the results in Table 2 are unlikely to reflect firms or dyads 
learning to collaborate and coordinate because they are drawn from models that hold constant a 
large number of learning correlates (e.g., partner-specific alliance experience, firms’ alliance 
experience, and their network tenure, age, and R&D intensity) and they additionally control for 
both stable and time-variant dyadic and firm heterogeneity, unobserved temporal effects, and the 
endogeneity of alliance governance. 
Subsector results 
The industry alliances measure is an imperfect proxy for an industry norm of 
collaboration and so I generated a number of additional models split by IT subsector. These 
models exploit the intuition that different subsectors within IT embraced open innovation at 
different rates during the sampling window, with the microelectronics and software subsectors 
expected to have stronger open innovation norms than computers and telecom subsectors. 
Reputational concerns associated with an industry norm of collaboration should thus be weaker in 
computers and telecom, and stronger in microelectronics and software subsectors. 
--- Take in Table 3 --- 
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Table 3 shows the subsector estimates for the shift parameter effect as predicted in 
Hypothesis 1. Because firms within a dyad regularly collaborated in multiple subsectors 
simultaneously (and increasingly so over time; see Figure 1), the total number of dyad-years 
across the three subsectors exceeds the sample size of Models 1 and 2 in Table 2. To isolate the 
effects of open innovation norms within alliances in individual subsectors, dummies for 
subsectors capture variance in knowledge transfer associated with dyads’ simultaneous activities 
in multiple subsectors. Note that the (marginally) significant computers/telecom dummy captures 
variance in knowledge transfer associated with a broad sectoral scope in software (Model 9), 
while the software dummy captures such scope-related variance in computers/telecom (Model 7) 
and microelectronics (Model 8). 
In Models 7-9, the interaction between Joint venture and Industry alliances is 
insignificant in computers/telecom (Model 7), negative and marginally significant in 
microelectronics (Model 8; p = 0.065), and negative and significant in software (Model 9). 
Moreover, the size of the coefficient on the interaction term is more than twice as large (-0.0011 
versus -0.0005) in software as in microelectronics, suggesting that the combined effects of 
alliance governance and an industry norm of collaboration play a much larger role in shaping 
knowledge transfer in software than in microelectronics. These findings are consistent with the 
suggestion that open innovation norms within these three IT subsectors differed in prevalence and 
importance during 1980-1999, with an industry norm of collaboration having a stronger effect in 
microelectronics rather than computers/telecom, and the strongest effect in software. 
--- Take in Table 4 --- 
Finally, to examine the idea that an industry norm of collaboration had the most 
substantive effect in bilateral contractual agreements (see Models 5 and 6 in Table 2), Table 4 
shows estimates of the interaction between Joint venture and Industry alliances in subsector 
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samples split by alliance type (bilateral versus multipartner alliances). Models 10-13 show no 
significant interaction effect across models of bilateral and multipartner alliances focusing on 
computers/telecom and microelectronics. In Models 14 and 15, the interaction between Joint 
venture and Industry alliances is negative and significant in bilateral software alliances, while it 
is insignificant in multipartner software alliances. 
--- Take in Figure 4 --- 
Based on Model 14, Figure 4 shows estimates of the comparative knowledge transfer 
efficacy of joint ventures relative to contractual agreements in bilateral alliances focused on the 
software subsector during the sampling period, assuming all else equal. The figure suggests that 
in software, an emerging industry norm of collaboration dramatically augmented the knowledge 
transfer benefits of bilateral contractual agreements. The conditional estimates show that in 
software, bilateral joint ventures generated more than 5.5 times as much knowledge transfer as 
bilateral contractual agreements in 1980. This comparative efficacy decreased sharply over time, 
as an otherwise identical joint venture only generated about 1.2 times as much knowledge 
transfer as an otherwise identical contractual agreement in 1999. Overall, consistent with the 
results aggregated across subsectors (Models 2-6 in Table 2), the benefits of an industry norm of 
collaboration appear substantive and concentrated disproportionally in bilateral contractual 
agreements. Moreover, consistent with the subsector results in Table 3, these effects occur 
especially in technology alliances within the software subsector. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
How does knowledge transfer in interfirm technology alliances change when an industry 
norm of collaboration evolves? I examined this question in some detail within the context of the 
U.S. information technology (IT) industry during 1980-1999, with a focus on historical changes 
in the alliance governance association with interfirm knowledge transfer. Descriptive evidence 
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suggests that during the study period, an industry norm of collaboration became progressively 
institutionalized in IT. I argued that such an industry norm began to act as an institutional 
reputation and monitoring system that produced incentives for, and reinforced, cooperative rather 
than opportunistic behavior. Because an industry norm of collaboration should have greater 
significance in situations where appropriation concerns are more prevalent, application of 
Williamson’s (1991) shift parameter logic suggests that over time, an evolving industry norm of 
collaboration has disproportionally increased knowledge transfer in technology alliances 
governed by contractual agreement relative to those governed by equity joint venture. The 
empirical analysis broadly corroborates this proposition. Moreover, the shift parameter effect 
appears particularly concentrated in bilateral rather than multipartner contractual agreements, and 
in the software and microelectronics subsectors. 
First, the assessment of longitudinal change in the alliance governance association with 
interfirm knowledge transfer complements prior alliance research. Some studies have suggested 
that the performance effects of alliance governance differ across alliances—e.g., technology, 
marketing, or production—and across different industries (e.g., Oxley, 1997, 1999; Pisano, 1989; 
Sampson, 2004). The results of this study additionally suggest that even within one type of 
alliance and within one industry, the performance and optimal governance of otherwise identical 
alliances may differ depending on the historical period in which they occur. Therefore, following 
calls both to exploit the unique insights that longitudinal data can offer (Bergh & Holbein, 1997; 
Isaac & Griffin, 1989) and to consider the historical context in which firm behavior transpires 
(Kahl, Silverman, & Cusumano, 2012), this study introduces a historical contingency into prior 
findings that have often shown effects averaged across time, even in designs spanning several 
decades (e.g., Gomes-Casseres et al., 2006). 
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Oxley’s (1999) seminal study was among the first to implement Williamson’s (1991) shift 
parameter logic, by connecting theoretically and empirically firms’ institutional environment to 
the governance structure of their alliances. However, as noted by Nickerson and Bigelow, “for 
inter-firm R&D relationships...the shift parameter framework has yet to be applied to investigate 
exchange performance” (2008: 192). The current study offers such an application, using the shift 
parameter framework to evaluate the performance rather than the choice of alliance governance 
structures (cf. Gulati & Nickerson, 2008). The findings offer fertile ground for further exploration 
of the longitudinal implications that institutional shift parameters may have for the performance 
and optimal governance of interfirm alliances. Indeed, governance structures that may appear 
misaligned with underlying transactional attributes could in fact represent the boundedly rational 
optimum when viewed through a historical lens that considers relevant changes in the 
institutional environment. For example, Hagedoorn’s (2002; see also Figure 1) observation that 
technology alliances became progressively governed by contractual agreement especially in 
uncertain environments appears consistent with an industry norm of collaboration acting on the 
relative benefits of contractual agreements versus joint ventures. 
Second, the introduction of broader norms associated with open innovation into an 
assessment of the material practices that constitute innovation ecosystems contributes new insight 
to the open innovation literature. The diffusion of the open innovation logic is reflected not just in 
the proliferation of a range of material practices, it is also evident in an evolving system of norms 
that may help govern such material practices. This generates the possibility that as open 
innovation practices become more prevalent, they at once become less risky and perhaps less 
costly, by enabling firms to substitute more arms-length governance arrangements for more 
hierarchical ones. Prior research has devoted considerable attention to exploring institutional 
differences across nations and industries, and how they shape firm behavior and performance in 
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the area of innovation (e.g., Alexy, Criscuolo, & Salter, 2009; Chesbrough, 1999). Among the 
implications of such work is the notion that the optimal organization for innovation differs across 
nations and industries. Complementing these findings, assuming all else equal, the evidence 
presented here suggests that the optimal organization of innovation activities also varies 
longitudinally, as open innovation norms evolve at the industry level. 
Third, the study shows that an industry-level reputation mechanism acts differentially 
across different types of alliances. The finding that the shift parameter effect is concentrated in 
bilateral contractual agreements suggests that appropriability hazards are less pronounced in 
multilateral joint ventures. This is consistent with the idea that more tightly coupled partners—
e.g., those coupled through equity joint ventures, common third parties, or both—have greater 
control over each other’s behavior and are better able to respond to ex post behavioral 
contingencies (Williamson, 1991). Moreover, partner control through tighter coupling appears 
more important absent institutional mechanisms that bound appropriation concerns, and less so in 
the presence of such institutional mechanisms. 
These findings may extend to the ecosystem level of analysis. For example, Brusoni and 
Prencipe (2013) suggest that the need for responsiveness and tighter coupling among the 
members of an ecosystem will be greater in an institutional regime with weak appropriability. 
This conceptual proposition on the institutional contingency of organizational coupling in 
ecosystems resonates closely with my empirical findings at the dyadic level of analysis. It thus 
opens up opportunities for the application of the shift parameter logic to the empirical analysis of 
interactions between the institutional environment and the prevalence and effectiveness of 
different types of coupling in innovation ecosystems. Similar to Williamson’s (1991) focus on 
both transactional hazards and the available governance solutions to address such hazards at the 
transaction level of analysis, Brusoni and Prencipe (2013) discuss both the cooperation and 
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coordination problems that firms in ecosystems may face as well as the solutions that different 
patterns of organizational coupling can offer to such problems. Thus, their discussion offers a 
good starting point to begin to think about the theoretical mechanisms through which the 
institutional environment may affect the difficulty of problems faced by firms in ecosystems, the 
effectiveness of coupling patterns in addressing such problems, or both. 
Fourth, technology alliances are one among a broader set of practices constituting 
innovation ecosystems, and the transfer of technological knowledge is only one of the relevant 
performance metrics. The ideas presented and tested here may extend to the study of other 
aspects of innovation ecosystems. Both the management of interdependence with complementors 
and coordination with a range of downstream distribution partners generates considerable risks, 
while dependencies between various complementors may be asymmetric (Adner, 2006; Kapoor, 
2013a). For example, Wood and West (2013) illustrate that though Symbian depended fully on its 
smartphone platform, this was not the case for a large number of complementors in its ecosystem. 
Therefore, the commitment of individual complementors to the shared success of the ecosystem 
was unbalanced. In these and other cases, perhaps broader norms can offer an informal source of 
channel incentives that stimulate multilateral cooperation by aligning the interests of the players 
in an ecosystem. 
Moreover, in a study of the global semiconductor manufacturing industry, Kapoor and 
McGrath (2012) document how different types of partners—i.e., suppliers, research 
organizations, and users—may be more or less prevalent in firms’ collaboration portfolios across 
the technology life cycle. It is conceivable that open innovation norms act on all such 
collaboration types. However, because the prevalence and importance of these partner types may 
differ over time, it is plausible that at different points in time, broader industry norms may have 
stronger or weaker effects in collaborations with different types of partners. Also, different norms 
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may act on different stages of the value chain, and interesting questions arise as to how firms’ 
reputations within one stage of the value chain spill over upstream or downstream. 
Additional opportunities exist to extend this research as well as address several of its 
limitations. First, the current analysis is truncated because it disregards the set-up costs of the 
governance alternatives. A more integrative analysis assesses both the benefits of governance 
solutions as well as their costs, with the potential to generate a greater understanding of the 
likelihood that firms substitute one governance structure for another. Second, the focus here has 
been on contractual agreements and joint ventures, two common modes of governance in 
technology alliances, and consideration of a broader set of governance mechanisms appears 
useful. Third, though the study period here reflects one in which open innovation began to 
evolve, important questions remain about the extent to which there may be limits to the 
development of collaborative norms associated with open innovation. Finally, Alexy and Reitzig 
(2013) show how in the mid 2000s, private-collective innovators in infrastructure software 
coordinated with one another by waiving their exclusion rights so as to establish a broader norm 
of non-enforcement. This began to expose even proprietary innovators to an unfavorable view of 
enforcing exclusion rights, generating both reputational benefits to innovators looking for 
cooperative solutions to intellectual property disputes as well as reputational penalties to those 
straightforwardly enforcing their property rights. These findings suggest that both the 
development of norms and their application may be confined to specific open innovation 
practices, which opens up avenues for a more granular assessment of the enabling and 
constraining functions of open innovation norms. 
The arguments and evidence presented in this study hopefully offer an impetus for further 
exploration of the interaction between parameters of the institutional environment and the costs 
and benefits of innovation ecosystems and their constituent open innovation practices. 
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APPENDIX A: FIRST-STAGE PROBIT MODEL 
Table A1 shows robust probit estimates for the choice of alliance governance structure in 
a firm-partner dyad. I use these estimates to construct an inverse Mills ratio λij,t for inclusion in 
the second-stage knowledge transfer models (Heckman, 1979). I model a binary choice in the 
first stage (i.e., 1 if a dyad contained at least one joint venture, 0 otherwise), even though about 
20% of the dyad-years contain more than one alliance. Thus, implicit in my modeling approach is 
the assumption that most of the endogeneity comes from the decision to use joint ventures at all. 
Nevertheless, results of two-stage models on dyads containing only one alliance reveal identical 
results. 
--- Take in Table A1 --- 
The first instrument is governance autocorrelation, which is the mean of the dependent 
variable (alliance governance structure) for all dyads the partner firms maintained in a given year, 
but excluding the focal dyad. This instrument takes the same form as the dyad autocorrelation 
measure in the second stage. Hence, it also addresses autocorrelation in the first stage (Lincoln, 
1984: 56-61). Further, since it controls partner firms’ baseline proclivities to favor joint ventures 
over contractual agreements, it also captures otherwise uncontrolled firm heterogeneity. The 
second instrument is industry joint ventures, the share of joint ventures in all newly-formed 
technology alliances within IT in a given year. 
Firms’ preference for joint ventures across their technology alliances should correlate 
positively with the focal dyad containing one or more joint ventures. This may reflect a dominant 
logic (Lampel & Shamsie, 2000) and perhaps perceptions of competence in managing a particular 
type of alliance (Levinthal & March, 1993). Such normative organizing principles affect firms’ 
rate of adopting a certain governance structure, while the adoption itself is the more proximate 
source of any performance consequences. Similarly, the aggregate industry-level preference for 
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joint ventures should correlate positively with the focal dyad containing one or more joint 
ventures. By institutional theory, firms tend to conform to externally constructed conceptions of 
legitimate organization (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and organizational theorists similarly suggest 
that a desire to keep pace with competition motivates firms to form ideas about appropriate action 
based on the actions of others in the industry (March, 1994). Thus, firms are more likely to adopt 
joint ventures if others in the industry also prefer joint ventures over contractual agreements. It is 
plausible that governance preferences in partner firms’ technology alliance portfolios, and within 
the industry, will be related to interfirm knowledge transfer only through their impact on dyadic 
alliance governance, making the exclusion of governance autocorrelation and industry joint 
ventures from the knowledge transfer equations valid (Murray, 2006). 
In addition to several variables included in the second stage models (Tables 2-4), I 
followed Lincoln (1984: 49-52) in including product terms for the firm-level controls (alliance 
experience, size, and R&D intensity) and I include prior patent cross-citations, a dyad-specific 
variable for the number of times two firms had cited each other’s patents by the observation year. 
This additional control captures the depth of the collaboration between partnered firms, and their 
propensity to draw on each other’s technological knowledge base extensively, and should be 
positively related to equity sharing in a dyadic relationship, all else equal. 
The odds that an alliance is governed by a joint venture increase by a multiplicative factor 
of 5.135 (i.e., exp[1.636]) as my measure of governance autocorrelation changes from zero to 
one. And the odds that an alliance is governed by a joint venture increase by a multiplicative 
factor of 37.864 (i.e., exp[3.634]) as my measure of industry joint ventures changes from zero to 
one. The likelihood of joint venture governance is thus highly sensitive to both instruments. 
Moreover, the combined t-value of these two variables is 13.349 (i.e., 6.466 + 6.883), suggesting 
they are jointly relevant as instrumental variables. 
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The coefficient on multipartner collaboration is positive and significant. In a sample of 
169 technology alliances commencing in 1996 in the electronics and telecommunications 
equipment industries, Oxley and Sampson (2004: 741) found similar coefficients on their 
measure of multipartner collaboration (i.e., Multilateral) in models predicting alliance 
governance structure (see also Sampson, 2004: 510). Such a finding may appear inconsistent with 
the argument that cohesion in a multipartner alliance acts as a reputation-inducing structure, 
while it appears consistent with the idea that free riding and coalition building are justified 
concerns in such alliances. Note that both these arguments focus on the probability of 
opportunistic behavior. However, even holding constant the probability of opportunism, bilateral 
and multipartner alliances may be governed by different governance structures because of 
differences in the interdependence of tasks within each type of alliance (Gulati & Singh, 1998). 
It is reasonable to imagine that interdependence may be greater in multipartner alliances, 
which creates coordination challenges that perhaps require a more hierarchical governance 
structure. Importantly, this may be the case regardless if the probability of opportunism is low or 
high. For this reason, we cannot use the governance selection model to infer if bilateral or instead 
multipartner alliances are subject to a greater probability of opportunistic behavior. In the 
knowledge transfer models, comparison of interactions between joint venture governance and an 
industry norm of collaboration across subsamples containing either bilateral or multipartner 
alliances (Models 5 and 6 in Table 2) offers a more compelling alternative, as an industry norm 
of collaboration will act narrowly on the probability of opportunistic behavior, and solely as a 
function of the monitoring and incentive alignment capacity of an alliance rather than its capacity 
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Note: the line shows the conditional effect of industry alliances on technological overlap
in contractual agreements across 1980-1999, based on Table 2, Model 3
 
 
Fig. 4. Estimates of knowledge transfer (technological overlap) in bilateral alliances focusing on 





















































Note: the line shows the ratio of estimated technological overlap in joint ventures to 
that in contractual agreements across 1980-1999, based on Table 4, Model 14
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Technological overlap 0.167 0.192 0 0.863
Industry alliances 185.567 49.438 22.6 246.6
Joint venture 0.426 0.495 0 1
Multipartner collaboration 0.261 0.439 0 1
Partner-specific alliances 1.396 1.056 1 14
Partner-specific alliance experience 0.777 1.492 0 17
Computers/telecom 0.490 0.500 0 1
Microelectronics 0.540 0.499 0 1
Software 0.297 0.457 0 1
Alliance experience (sum) 83.788 70.306 3 383
Time in network (sum) 19.204 8.229 2 41
Age (sum) 7.339 1.166 3.296 9.915
Size (sum, in millions of U.S. $) 46,180.680 49,734.450 339.000 321,256
R&D intensity (sum) 0.177 0.068 0.022 0.547
Dyad autocorrelation 0.179 0.136 0 0.748
Inverse Mills ratio 0.029 0.602 -3.071 2.488
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Table 2. Fixed effects linear models of technology alliance governance and interfirm knowledge 









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Industry alliances 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.0027*** 0.001 0.000 0.001+
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Joint venture 0.126* 0.235*** - - 0.380*** 0.386***
(0.058) (0.064) - - (0.043) (0.087)
Joint venture × Industry alliances - -0.001*** - - -0.0006*** -0.0007
- (0.000) - - (0.000) (0.000)
Multipartner collaboration 0.008 0.003 0.000 0.001 - -
(0.009) (0.009) (0.028) (0.010) - -
Partner-specific alliances -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.019***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Partner-specific alliance experience -0.004 -0.004 -0.012 -0.002 -0.015** -0.013**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Computers/telecom 0.008 0.007 -0.002 0.010 -0.002 -0.019
(0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.012) (0.010) (0.018)
Microelectronics 0.021* 0.020+ 0.021 0.022 -0.004 0.014
(0.011) (0.010) (0.020) (0.014) (0.011) (0.021)
Software 0.012 0.014 -0.013 0.026* 0.009 0.043*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.018) (0.012) (0.011) (0.020)
Alliance experience (sum) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Time in network (sum) -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.020*** -0.003 0.002+ -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.001) (0.003)
Age (sum) 0.094*** 0.068* 0.068 0.025 -0.034*** -0.033*
(0.027) (0.028) (0.047) (0.039) (0.006) (0.014)
Size (sum) -0.000* -0.000+ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R&D intensity (sum) 0.023 -0.041 -0.134 -0.000 -0.115 0.073
(0.086) (0.087) (0.132) (0.117) (0.081) (0.152)
Dyad autocorrelation 0.014 0.016 0.031 -0.024 -0.018 -0.110
(0.030) (0.030) (0.040) (0.045) (0.028) (0.091)
Inverse Mills ratio -0.018 -0.018 -0.036 -0.010 -0.095*** -0.087**
(0.012) (0.011) (0.028) (0.014) (0.014) (0.030)
Constant -0.679*** -0.568** -0.448 -0.224 0.144 -0.113
(0.206) (0.206) (0.339) (0.314) (0.114) (0.184)
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Dyad-years 1,888 1,888 1,083 805 1,396 492
Unique dyads 581 581 458 126 518 171
R-squared 0.131 0.142 0.128 0.194 0.240 0.281




Table 3. Fixed effects linear models of technology alliance governance and interfirm knowledge 








Industry alliances 0.001 0.001+ 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Joint venture 0.018 0.116 0.555***
(0.124) (0.085) (0.144)
Joint venture × Industry alliances -0.0004 -0.0005+ -0.0011*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Multipartner collaboration 0.009 -0.010 0.007
(0.015) (0.012) (0.020)
Partner-specific alliances -0.000 0.000 -0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Partner-specific alliance experience -0.008* 0.010+ -0.008+
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Computers/telecom - -0.008 0.031+
- (0.017) (0.018)
Microelectronics -0.005 - -0.020
(0.017) - (0.025)
Software 0.026* 0.031+ -
(0.013) (0.018) -
Alliance experience (sum) -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Time in network (sum) 0.000 -0.010+ -0.016+
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009)
Age (sum) 0.008 -0.000 0.094
(0.047) (0.049) (0.062)
Size (sum) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R&D intensity (sum) 0.000 -0.060 -0.636*
(0.116) (0.122) (0.289)
Dyad autocorrelation 0.043 -0.050 -0.060
(0.041) (0.042) (0.082)
Inverse Mills ratio -0.006 -0.032 -0.009
(0.018) (0.020) (0.023)
Constant 0.026 0.046 -0.934*
(0.332) (0.349) (0.444)
Time fixed effects Y Y Y
Dyad-years 925 1,019 560
Unique dyads 366 342 179
R-squared 0.171 0.168 0.283




Table 4. Fixed effects linear models of technology alliance governance and interfirm knowledge 















(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Industry alliances 0.001* -0.000 0.003*** 0.018 0.004*** 0.004+
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.013) (0.001) (0.002)
Joint venture -0.025 - -0.041 - 0.436** -
(0.131) - (0.094) - (0.158) -
Joint venture × Industry alliances -0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.021 -0.001* -0.000
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.002)
Partner-specific alliances -0.002 -0.005 -0.000 -0.019+ 0.002 -0.030**
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010)
Partner-specific alliance experience -0.007 -0.019** -0.008 0.005 -0.003 -0.014+
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008)
Computers/telecom - - -0.021 0.003 0.028 -0.051
- - (0.032) (0.026) (0.022) (0.041)
Microelectronics 0.021 -0.119* - - -0.013 -0.106*
(0.025) (0.047) - - (0.034) (0.053)
Software 0.013 0.080 -0.040 0.035 - -
(0.016) (0.049) (0.031) (0.024) - -
Alliance experience (sum) -0.001+ 0.001 -0.001* 0.000 -0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Time in network (sum) -0.006 0.009 -0.023*** 0.002 -0.019* -0.019
(0.005) (0.019) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010) (0.025)
Age (sum) 0.077+ -0.171 0.117* 0.630*** 0.138* -0.730+
(0.047) (0.355) (0.054) (0.162) (0.066) (0.428)
Size (sum) -0.000+ 0.000 -0.000 0.000+ -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R&D intensity (sum) 0.026 -1.571* -0.445** 0.769** -0.619+ -0.493
(0.117) (0.608) (0.141) (0.248) (0.321) (0.735)
Dyad autocorrelation 0.065 -0.110 -0.048 0.111 -0.058 -0.292
(0.041) (0.214) (0.046) (0.133) (0.086) (0.326)
Inverse Mills ratio 0.003 0.062 -0.023 -0.011 0.041 -0.025
(0.029) (0.062) (0.023) (0.074) (0.033) (0.056)
1990s 0.043* 0.000 0.043* -0.065* 0.017 0.037
(0.021) (0.000) (0.020) (0.025) (0.037) (0.122)
Constant -0.557+ 1.780 -0.749* -4.376*** -1.103* 5.685+
(0.299) (2.605) (0.375) (1.179) (0.428) (3.134)
Dyad-years 808 117 733 286 384 176
Unique dyads 354 57 308 93 135 76
R-squared 0.133 0.401 0.192 0.171 0.233 0.396
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1; all tests are two-tailed.
Note:  In the multipartner collaboration subsector samples, there is insufficient within-dyad variance on Joint venture and so its main 





Table A1. Robust probit estimates of alliance governance structure (1 = joint venture; 0 = 













Prior patent cross-citations 0.005***
(0.001)
Alliance experience (sum) -0.002
(0.002)






R&D intensity (sum) 0.620
(1.647)











Robust (dyad clustered) standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1; all tests are two-tailed.
 
